

# The Edges of Ownership

## A Behavioural, Financial Paradox


Perspectives from Australia & the UK

Susan J Smith, collaborating with  
Rachel Ong, Gavin Wood  
Melek Cigdem

# Owner occupation: A curious centrepiece of modern housing systems



Smith, S. J. (2015)  
Owner  
occupation: at  
home in a spatial,  
financial paradox.  
*International  
Journal of  
Housing Policy*  
15: 61-83



# The (financial and ethical) normalisation of home ownership

- Smith, S. J. (2015) Owner occupation: at home in a spatial, financial paradox. *International Journal of Housing Policy* 15: 61-83
- Smith, S. J. (2008) Owner Occupation: Living with a Hybrid of Money and Materials. *Environment and Planning A* 40: 520-535

# The (financial and ethical) normalisation of home ownership

- **INCOME SMOOTHING across the life course** (the social project of home ownership, and the rise of the **housing consumer**)
- **INVESTMENT AND ASSET ACCUMULATION** (the neo-liberalisation of the housing economy and the emergence of **the investor figure**)
- **WELFARE SWITCHING** (using equity extraction – especially in the form of equity borrowing - to position housing as an asset-based welfare; enter, **the actuarial subject/self-insuring citizen**)



# *Final Report*

Australia and University of Western

October 2013

AHURI Final Report No. 216

ISSN: 1834-7223

ISBN: 978-1-922075-45-1

# Observing the edges: Au; UK

- (Mortgage market) Similarities
  - Relatively complete, reasonably well regulated mortgage markets
  - No longer nationally circumscribed but with limited exposure to the extremes of subprime
  - Success in restoring ‘business as usual’ after the GFC
- (Institutional) Differences
  - Size and function of rented sectors
  - Variable systems of social security
- Some signals about the functioning of housing markets as a whole

# Observing the edges: Au; UK

- A balanced panel from BHPS and HILDA to follow 5969 Australian and 5874 British individuals through one or more ownership spells across the decade 2001 – 2010
- Longitudinal data sets: a wealth of socio-economic and demographic variables; can link biographical shifts, life transitions and external shocks to changes in individuals' housing circumstances.
- Similar survey structure/ methods of data collection maximise comparability.

The first  
surprise...



International Journal of Housing Policy

Routledge  
Taylor & Francis Group

ISSN: 1461-6718 (Print) 1473-3269 (Online) Journal homepage: <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reuj20>

## Life on the edge: a perspective on precarious home ownership in Australia and the UK

Gavin A. Wood, Susan J. Smith, Melek Cigdem & Rachel Ong

To cite this article: Gavin A. Wood, Susan J. Smith, Melek Cigdem & Rachel Ong (2015): Life on the edge: a perspective on precarious home ownership in Australia and the UK, International Journal of Housing Policy, DOI: [10.1080/14616718.2015.1115225](https://doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2015.1115225)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2015.1115225>

	Owners (to 2010)	Exit
UK	91%	9%
AU	79%	21%





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# Over the edge...

- 1. The risks of exit (life tables and hazard rates)
- 2. The predictors of exit (discrete-time hazard regression model of the effects of Socio-economic characteristics, personal circumstances and financial behaviours)
- 3. The influence of institutions

**Figure 1: Hazard rate, Australia and UK, 2001–10 and 2002-10**



# Predictors of exit from OO

Modelling exercise (good fit; explains over 2/3 variance in exit data)

- **Financial stress:** low incomes/ loss of employment
- **GFC** (calendar year)
- **Biographical disruption:** relationship breakdown; poor health (especially UK)
- **Younger age groups**
- **Staying power:** duration of ownership spell
- **Complexities of debt** (risks from debt accumulation/high LTV v. protective effects of financial buffering)

# But, institutions also matter...


- Country-specific risks of exit are not explained by differences in personal attributes
- Characteristics of rental sector have an effect
  - UK private renting is small and not diverse
  - UK social renting selects for measurable needs (notably through ‘medical priority’)
  - Overall the UK rental sector is less effective than in Au at ‘oiling the wheels’ at the edges of ownership
- Safety nets for mortgagors and lender forbearance enabled UK households to ‘cling on’

A second  
surprise...

# What happens next?

- Among those who drop out of ownership, the majority return: 2/3 Australians, and 1/2 in UK re-enter ownership by 2010 (Churners)
- To identify the drivers of return : a mix of approaches
  - A qualitative impression
  - Another (discrete time hazard) modelling exercise

# Ongoing Owner



# Predictors of return to 00

- Ability to secure/sustain a mortgage
  - A GFC effect
  - Employment (AU) and Education (UK)
- A lump sum to roll in
  - Equity released on sale of previous property
  - Rent-free period (UK)
- A sustainable alternative (**social housing**, UK)
- Manageable non-housing costs costs
  - married (Au)/repartnered (UK) (scale economies)
  - **dependent children** (UK)
  - Better than fair health (Au)
  - **Adding a child while renting**
- Demographics
  - **Older age**

# What does 'churning' achieve?

- On average: Churning is associated with a real increase in home values (median Au\$92k; £54k) that exceeds the real change in mortgage debt (median Au\$72k, £0)
- An impact on assets and debt relative to other ownership trajectories (Au data only)



# What does 'churning' achieve?

## Impact on assets and debt (AU)

AUSTRALIA	All churner		Leavers		Stayers	
Median Values Irrespective of ownership status	Total Assets (\$'000)	Total Debt (\$'000)	Total Assets (\$'000)	Total Debt (\$'000)	Total Assets (\$'000)	Total Debt (\$'000)
<b>2002</b>	365.8	68.7	270.1	11.2	528.1	11.2
<b>2006</b>	595.1	89.2	355.8	5.6	734.8	19.0
<b>2010</b>	745.5	152.1	178.0	0.0	822.1	19.2
<i>No. of individuals</i>	776		515		4678	

AUSTRALIA	All churner		Leavers		Stayers	
Median Values Conditional on Ownership	Total Assets (\$'000)	Total Debt (\$'000)	Total Assets (\$'000)	Total Debt (\$'000)	Total Assets (\$'000)	Total Debt (\$'000)
<b>2002</b>	443.0	112.5	364.8	59.1	594.1	23.9
<b>2006</b>	633.5	165.6	588.9	111.1	767.2	26.3
<b>2010</b>	812.1	196.3	-	-	822.1	19.2
<i>No. of individuals</i>	2002, <b>534</b> ; 2006, <b>499</b> ; 2010, <b>649</b>		2002, <b>358</b> ; 2006, <b>268</b> ; 2010, <b>0</b>		2002, <b>4135</b> ; 2006, <b>4439</b> ; 2010, <b>4678</b>	

# What does 'churning' achieve?

- Australia panel shifts (median figures) at a glance:
  - Ongoing owners build assets and contain debt
  - Leavers lose both assets and debt
  - Churners build assets and grow debt
- In 'fast facts'
  - The median value of Churners' total assets increase from 1.4x to 4.2x times that of leavers; and from 70% to 90% of those of ongoing owners
  - The median value of Churners' total debt overall grows from 6.1x to 7.9x that of ongoing owners (measured only when in ownership it grows from 4.7x to 10.2x)

# What does 'churning' achieve?

- On average: a shift towards more rooms per dwelling (though with a significant proportion in both countries – 18%Au, 29%UK – downsize)
- But note here a Au/Uk divergence.
  - Downsizers Au, disproportionately older, separated, NILF, lower incomes, **extracted most equity from previous sale**
  - Downsizers, Uk, less obviously older, as well represented as upsizers among marrieds and employed, **have above average incomes**, but extracted least equity from previous sale

# What does 'churning' achieve?

- On average for Au (no UK comparator) a locational premium:
  - A net shift out of the lowest 20% SIEFA index neighbourhoods on all 4 measures of socio-economic disadvantage, economic resources and education/occupation
  - Though most (c. 40%) stay the same, and only a slightly higher proportion improve their position (28-32%) than lose ground (24%)
  - Those moving into higher decile neighbourhoods (measure 1) as likely to lose rooms as those moving to lower deciles


# Churning in a nutshell

- Whereas exit was precipitated by financial stress and biographical disruption, re-entry depends on effective stewardship of assets and an appetite for debt
- Churners do better (except perhaps on wellbeing) than lasting leavers, but they do not, on the whole, do as well financially as ongoing owners
- Nor, despite paying more, do they necessarily improve their housing position
  - As many as two-thirds occupy dwellings of a similar or smaller size (number of rooms)
  - A similar proportion moves to a similar or less well-off neighbourhood when they regain owner occupation


# Churning in a nutshell

- Mixed fortunes (at least two Churner types?)
- Geography matters: UK and Australian churners have different characteristics, different equity exchange behaviours, and possibly different housing pathways

# Churner Type 1: Possibly transitioning to the mainstream



# Churner Type 2: Precarious housing position





# Churning: problem or solution?

- Various factors explain why households dip into/out of ownership [pace of market, relocation, financial stress]
- ‘Churn’ offers flexibility to sellers (except in extreme financial stress), buys time for house search, and enable households in temporary financial stress to swap the costs of owning/renting
- Churn might be well suited to housing systems with a large, diverse, well-regulated rental sector; it could be the sign of a well-oiled market
- But transactions costs and other risks (being priced out of market) are high and the gains are uncertain

# Some problems at the margins

- Equity borrowing – important for retaining owner occupation, but highly risky way of dipping into housing wealth
- Churning – a way to adjust housing costs to incomes and expenditures, but costly and awkward

# Beyond the binary

- Pragmatically, address a gap in the market for personal financial products enabling home occupiers to:
  - Swap the costs of owning and renting without moving
  - Extract housing equity without adding to debt
- This would imply interest in equity finance for housing which would also enable households to
  - Choose ‘less than whole-home’ ownership (more properly invest in less than the whole asset value of one’s home)
  - hold housing wealth indirectly
- It might signal a new style of home occupation
  - In a tenure neutral housing system

# Some other reasons for a change


- Housing markets are a source of macro-economic instability; debt financing is implicated in this
- Debt finance is still uncertain
- House prices are likely to rise
  - Affordability will remain an issue
  - it is essential to reduce incentives to excess leverage
- Investment risks in housing markets require better recognition and management (esp. for older people)
- There has been little real innovation in housing finance, including mortgage contract design, over the years

# Erasing the Edges of Ownership Resolving a Behavioural, Financial Paradox

Perspectives from Australia & the UK

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**Figure 1: Hazard rate, Australia and UK, 2001–10**



**Figure 2: Hazard rate, Australia and UK, 2002–2010**

