
THANK YOU

Why does Perth stand alone?

Analysing the drivers of urban primacy in Australian states

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Australian Urban Design Research Centre (AUDRC) &
UWA Department of Geography and Planning



Supervisors: Professor Fiona Haslam-McKenzie and Dr Julian Bolleter



Contents

- Research team
- Research origins
- Background
- Theory being tested
- Methods & Results
- Discussion & Recommendations

PhD Team: Supervisors





Fiona Haslam McKenzie

- Professor, UWA Department of Geography
- Research areas: Regional Economic Development, Resources, Community Development

Julian Bolleter

- Director, UWA Australian Urban Design Research Centre
- Research areas: Landscape
 Architecture, Urban Design, Regional Planning, New City Development






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
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
Research origins






Frontiers & disruptive bigness






Los Angeles, 1869 Population: 5,700*






Los Angeles, 2020 Population: 17.5 million















 Perth is like a young San Francisco or Los Angeles, it will boom





 Western Australia is like a young California, second cities will boom



Only Perth boomed

...why?




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Why does Perth stand alone?

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
Decentralisation




- **Multiple large cities**
- **Settlement indicative of economic** productivity and geology
- One dominant city
- Stunted and missing 2nd cities
- **Settlement indicative of political** geography; primate cities are almost always political capitals (or were)



Measures of primacy






Total Urban Population

- Period of analysis: 2016 census data
- Red line indicates a minimum measure of 'High' Primacy, 2.0
- *Largest City Population combines Brisbane and Gold Coast, as per Brinkhoff (2022)

A long history of primacy



Repeated, ongoing federal and state initiatives to decentralise population growth



Why should we care about decentralisation?

Congestion Costs



Suppression


Costs

Regional Inequality

Sovereign Risk



What's driving primacy in states? ...is not a new question



Research gap: Theories about Australian primacy do not engage with institutions; whilst internationally primacy is regarded as indicative of specific kinds of political institutions.



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JOURNAL ARTICLE

Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants

Get access >

Alberto F. Ades, Edward L. Glaeser

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 110, Issue 1, February 1995, Pages 195–227,


https://doi.org/10.2307/2118515

Published: 01 February 1995


Seminal paper that draws a causal link between institutions and settlement pattern.



Institutional Economics: If you build it...



Contrary to neoclassical economics, where markets are singular drivers of the economy, institutional economics emphasize 'the rules of the game,' the foundational, formal and informal constraints on capital accumulation which condition and sculpt development



Building what?

Who's building it?

With who's permission?


How often do they build things?

Where do they build?

Where's money from?



Theoretical Model: Institutional Economics




Are institutional explanations of primacy relevant in Australia?



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1. Quantitative Analysis: Sample





1. Quantitative Analysis: Variables

| Variables analysed in statistical model of city populations |
|---|
| State capital status |
| Federal capital status |
| Latitude |
| Longitude |
| Navigable waterway |
| Rainfall |
| Temperature |
| Major seaport |
| Major airport |

From 1911-2016, which factors, if any, correlate with population? Method: Multiple linear regression

1. Quantitative Analysis: Results

| Variables analysed in statistical model of city populations |
|---|
| State capital status |
| Federal capital status |
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
See: Wilkinson, G., Haslam McKenzie, F., Bolleter, J., Hooper, P. (2023). Political centralization, federalism, and urbanization: Evidence from Australia, *Social Science History*. 47(1).





2. Intergovernmental Power

 How are administrative, political and fiscal powers distributed between tiers of government in Australia?











2. Intergovernmental Power: Results

Political Power


Existence & autonomy of local government compromised, volatile.

Fiscal Power

Extreme vertical fiscal imbalance; local & state performance intertwined; little use of debt in local government

Administrative Power

Decentralised responsibilities, low autonomy in local government



See: Wilkinson, G., Haslam McKenzie, F., Bolleter, J. (2022). Federalism and urban primacy: Political dimensions that influence the city-country divide in Australia. *International Journal of Urban Sciences*, 26 (3).

3. Interviews

- 37 semi-structured interviews
 - Why do we have primacy?
 - Are there growth constraints in the regions? If so, what are they?
 - Should we do anything about urban primacy? If so, what? If not, why not?

See: Wilkinson, G., Haslam McKenzie, F., Bolleter, J., (2022), Why does Perth stand alone? Interviews with subject matter experts about the drivers of settlement in Western Australia. *Australian Geographer*.

3. Interviewees (37) included current and/or former...

| Federal Minister |
|--|
| Federal Senator |
| State Premier |
| State Minister |
| State Department CEO |
| Regional Development Commission CEO |
| Regional Development Non-profit Organisation CEO |
| Local Government Mayor/President |
| Local Government CEO |
| Local Government Association CEO |
| Economics/Economic Geography Professor |
| Federalism Professor |
| Local Government Professor |
| Global Consultancy Partner (Infrastructure & Regional Development) |

3. Interviews

29/37 Attributed primacy to institutional factors

Sub-state government weakness and regional neglect widely invoked

Primacy is costly and a problem. Something should be done

Devolve power, enable bottom-up empowerment, leadership



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Project Insights

- Australian case is consistent with international experience, albeit a sub-national version. Institutional theory appears relevant.
- There is no political-institutional foundation from which bottom-up economic development can be independently, capably spearheaded and sustained by local or regional governments
- We cannot speak of regions 'missing out' or 'failing' relative to economic opportunities when they've never had the agency or power to lead/grow.
- Development is beholden to top-down initiatives which rationally prioritize existing settlements and population centres.
- It is not the grants systems that is the problem, it is the system's singularity.




Recommendations (1/5)

1. Transcend the top-down paradigm

Problem: Decentralisation ideas and strategies come from top down with little devolution of legally binding powers.

Old paradigm: Centralized orchestration of decentralization

New paradigm: Centralized enablement and support of bottom-up decentralized economic development





Recommendations (2/5)

2. Broaden local own-source revenues

- Problem: LGAs have few own-source revenues.
 - Without measurable elastic income (e.g. sales tax) local governments as organisations lack a critical link between operational and fiscal performance
- Recommendation: Create tax room for locally derived, locally distributed sales taxes
 - 'Earned here, stays here' at the local level.




Recommendations (3/5)

- 3. Provide a state oversight model option that decouples local and state government balance sheets (e.g., home-rule charters)
- Problem: It's rational for states to standardize, micromanage, and restrain local governments given their fiscal and legal entanglement as organisations.
- Recommendation: Implement local constitutions for 'qualifying' councils. Build up, formalise local governments as credible, autonomous fiscal entities.



Recommendations (4/5)

4. Reconfigure the sub-state government operating model





Recommendations (5/5)

5. Pick winners and formalise regional capitals

- Problem: 'Cities' as political units have compromised existence. They lack bottom-up growth avenues
- Recommendation: Formalise and empower what it means to be a 'regional capital'. Capitals within the 3rd tier of government
 - 'Non-capital' cities in the USA, Canada actually are 'capitals'. They're <u>all</u> county seats





To learn more:

- George.wilkinsoniii@research.uwa.edu.au
- On Google Scholar search 'Wilkinson' and 'urban primacy'
 - 3x articles published
 - 2x in press

THANK YOU

